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Two acts of some significance were passed at the 1984 Session of
the Louisiana Legislature amending Louisiana Civil Code article 146.
One act does little more than respond affirmatively to the United States
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
* Although this paper does not consider the topic, filiation continues to be an area
of family law which generates the active interest of the legislature and, the judiciary. Act
810 of 1984 amended Civil Code article 209(C) to provide procedures for proving filiation
for certain purposes within one year of the death of the alleged parent; however, this
peremptive period does not apply to efforts to establish beneficiary status under article
2315. Under the amendment, an illegitimate child over the age of 19 can institute an
action to establish filiation to a parent, for the purpose of recovery of damages under
article 2315, within one year of the parent's death. Some serious constitutional issues may
be raised by the creation of a class of actions an illegitimate child may bring regardless
of his age and others that he may not, such as support under article 229 and inheritance.
However, such a distinction may be justified. In an action for damages under article 2315
the stability of land titles is not at issue, although protecting against "stale" proof is
involved in both types of actions.
In Lamana v. LeBlanc, 449 So. 2d 31 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 450 So. 2d
959 (La. 1984), (three Justices dissenting) the court of appeal affirmed a judgment that
sustained the defendant's peremptory exception of no cause and no right of action. The
exceptions were filed in response to plaintiff's suit to be recognized as the father of
defendant's son. According to the court, the natural father had no right or cause of
action to establish his paternity because the child was born within 300 days of defendant's
divorce from her husband; therefore, the child was conclusively presumed to be the child
of the husband by virtue of his failure to disavow paternity. The authority for refusing
to permit such a suit was Fontenot v. Thierry, 422 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 868 (La. 1983).
Since the Lamana decision, there have been two other courts of appeal decisions
considering the issue of establishing filiation to a father other than the husband of the
mother. The first circuit court of appeal, sitting en banc in Griffin v. Succession of
Branch, 452 So. 2d 344 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), concluded that the plaintiffs had no
right to bring an action to establish filiation to a man other than the husband of their
mother, who was conclusively presumed to be their father. The language of the court
was: "LSA-C.C. art. 209, as amended by Act 720 of 1981, implies that a child who
enjoys legitimate filiation, or is legitimated or formally acknowledged, cannot institute a
proceeding to establish filiation." Id. at 346-47 (footnote omitted). An earlier symposium
article written by this author was cited for a similar view. Developments in the Law,
1980-1981-Persons, 42 La. L. Rev. 403 (1982). In so deciding, the court expressly overruled
its own decision in Succession of Levy, 428 So. 2d 904 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983): "In
carefully reading the statutory changes made in Act 720, we feel compelled to overrule
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Supreme Court decision in Palmore v. Sidoti.1 Article 146 now provides
that no parent is to be preferred because of his race;2 and as a specific
our previous holding in Succession of Levy and find that the legislative intent is that a
child entitled to legitimate filiation may not institute a proceeding to establish filiation
to another man." Griffin, 452 So. 2d at 347. In Succession of Levy, the court had
interpreted Article 209 ("a child not entitled to legitimate filiation") "to mean 'a child
who is not entitled to legitimate filiation to the parent to whom he is attempting to prove
filiation.' " Id.
Although the court expressed the opinion that "the Second and Third Circuits indicated
that they agree with this inference of legislative intent. IMC Exploration Co. v. Henderson,
supra; Fontenot v. Thierry, 422 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427
So. 2d 868 (La. 1983)," id., the Third Circuit Court of Appeal reached a different result
in Durr v. Blue, 454 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984). In Durr the court permitted
a natural father to assert his paternity as to children born to the mother while married
to another man. According to the court: "The failure of the presumed legal father to
timely bring a disavowal action should not operate to deny the biological father his
parental rights. Such a result would be a violation of the due process provisions of the
United States and Louisiana Constitutions." Id. at 318. For a contrary argument, which
distinguishes filiation from the old effects of classification, see Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest
Presumption Challenged: Speculations on Warren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell,
37 La. L. Rev. 59 (1976). Judge Domengeaux, who had authored the opinion in Fontenot
v. Thierry, cited in Griffin v. Succession of Branch, dissented.
The two decisions, however, need not be interpreted as inconsistent. There is an
important legal distinction between the facts in the Griffin case and those in the Durr
case. In the Griffin case, the children were registered as children of the husband of the
mother on their birth certificates; but, in the Durr case the children were registered as
that of the natural father. There is scholarly opinion to the effect that under Civil Code
article 197, the presumption of Louisiana Civil Code article 184 does not apply if the
children are not registered as children of the husband of the mother. R. Pascal & K.
Spaht, Louisiana Family Law Course 366-67 (3d ed. 1982); Spaht & Shaw, supra.
In an unreported district court opinion, Succession of Grice, article 209 was declared
unconstitutional because it discriminated against illegitimates in three ways:
First, it requires them to prove their filiation in a suit brought for that purpose
while legitimates are allowed to prove their filiation in the succession proceeding
itself. Second, the burden of proof for illegitimates is more stringent, i.e., clear
and convincing evidence as opposed to a preponderance of the evidence required
of legitimates. Finally, the prescriptive period applied to illegitimates in order
to participate in their parent's succession is shorter than the period which is
applied to legitimates.
Succession of Grice, Probate No. 9034 (32d La. Jud. Dist. Ct. June 28, 1984). The
decision was reversed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Succession of Grice, No. 87-1761,
slip op. (La. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 1985).
** Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984).
2. La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(2), as amended by La. Acts 1984, No. 133, § 1 ("A.
If there are children of the marriage whose provisional custody is claimed by both husband
and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, custody shall be awarded in the
following order of preference, according to the best interest of the children: . . . (2) To
either parent. In making an order for custody to either parent, the court shall consider,
among other factors, which parent is more likely to allow the child or children frequent
and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent, and shall not prefer a parent as
custodian because of that parent's sex or race. The burden of proof that joint custody
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response to the Supreme Court decision, the classification of persons
according to race is "neither relevant nor permissible" in custody de-
terminations. 3
In Palmore v. Sidoti,4 it was not the race of the parent at issue
but the mother's marriage to a person of another race. When a change
of custody was sought by the father because of the mother's cohabitation
and subsequent marriage to a black man, the Florida trial court con-
cluded that the best interest of the child would be served by awarding
custody to the father. The Florida Court of Appeal affirmed the lower
court's judgment; the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed. Importantly, the Florida trial court had found that there
was "no issue as to either party's devotion to the child, adequacy of
housing facilities, or respect(a)bility of the new spouse of either parent." 5
Thus, the court's conclusion as to the child's welfare was based solely
on "what it regarded as the damaging impact on the child from remaining
in a racially-mixed household." '6
The United States Supreme Court held, that the trial court's removal
of custody from the mother, which constituted state action, was a denial
of equal protection of the law. The question under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as posed by the Court,
was "whether the reality of private biases and the possible injury they
might inflict are permissible considerations for removal of an infant
child from the custody of its natural mother." '7 The Court concluded
that they are not; private biases may not be given effect by law,
particularly in view of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to
eradicate racial discrimination. Obviously, the amendments made to
article 146 are consistent with the Supreme Court opinion in Palmore.
Two acts of potentially greater impact relating to the custody pro-
ceeding authorize the court to order an evaluation of the parties and
children by a mental health professional' and to require the parties to
submit to mediation. 9 Companion amendments to the Revised Statutes,
would not be in a child's best interest shall be upon the parent requesting sole custody.").
See La. Const. art. III, § 1.
3. Id. art. 146(C)(2)(1) ("C. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint
custody is in the best interest of a minor child. . . . (2) The presumption in favor of
joint custody may be rebutted by a showing that it is not in the best interest of the
child, after consideration of evidence introduced with respect to all of the following
factors: .. . (1) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
child custody dispute. However, the classification of persons according to race is neither
relevant nor permissible.").
4. 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984).
5. Id. at 1881.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1882.
8. La. Civ. Code art. 146(H), as amended by La. Acts 1984, No. 786, § I.
9. Id. art. 146(I). Cf. Alaska Stat. § 25.20.060 (1982); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-
19841
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regulations governing mediation in a custody or visitation proceeding,
were enacted which specify the duties and qualifications of the mediator
and the confidentiality of the mediation.' 0
The evaluation by a mental health professional, defined in the ar-
ticle,"1 may be requested by motion of either party. The judge has
discretion in ordering the evaluation by the professional, who is to be
chosen by the parties or by the court. The costs may be apportioned
between the parties, and the evaluation is to be in writing furnished to
the court and both parties.12
In contrast to the mental health evaluation, mediation may be or-
dered by the court on its own motion.' 3 It is appropriate to order
mediation when, from the face of the pleadings, custody or visitation
is contested or when, during the proceedings, it appears that mediation
is in the best interest of the children."4 Obviously, the policy to be
served by the statute on mediation is different from that of the mental
health evaluation. In fact, the purpose is stated in the legislation: "The
purpose of such mediation proceeding shall be to reduce acrimony which
may exist between the parties and to develop an agreement assuring the
child or children's close and continuing contact with both parents after
the marriage is dissolved."' 5 The statute, in relatively detailed fashion,
prescribes the duties of the mediator, 6 the contents and review of the
381.24 (1977); Cal. Civ. Code § 4607 (West 1981); Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.513 (1982);
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-3-111, 40-3-127 (1983).
10. 1984 La. Acts, No. 788, § 1, adding La. R.S. 9:351-356.
11. La. Civ. Code art. 146(H), as amended by La. Acts 1984, No. 786, § I ("For
the purposes of this Article, 'mental health professional' means a psychiatrist or a person
who possesses a Master's degree in counseling, social work, psychology, or marriage and
family counseling.").
12. La. Civ. Code art. 146(H) ("The mental health professional shall provide the
court and both parties with a written report. The mental health professional shall serve
as the witness of the court subject to cross-examination by either party.").
13. La. Civ. Code art. 146(I) ("In any custody or visitation proceeding, the court,
on its own motion or the motion of either party, may require the parties to mediate
their differences.").
14. 1984 La. Acts, No. 788, § 1, adding La. R.S. 9:351 ("When it appears on the
face of the petition or motion for an order or modification of an order for the custody
or visitation of a child or children that either or both such issues are contested, or when
during such a proceeding it appears to the court to be in the best interest of the child
or children, the parties may be required to mediate their differences upon the motion of
the court or upon the motion of either party."). Cf. Cal. Civ. Code § 4607(a) (West
1981).
15. 1984 La. Acts, No. 788, § 1, adding La. R.S. 9:352. Cf. Cal. Civ. Code §
4607(a) (West 1981).
16. Id., adding La. R.S. 9:353 ("In performing the mediation contemplated herein,
the mediator shall assist the parties in formulating a written, signed, and dated agreement
to mediate which shall identify the controversies between the parties, affirm the parties'
intent to resolve these controversies through mediation, and specify the circumstances
under which the mediation may terminate. The mediator has a duty to advise each of
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mediation agreement, 7 confidentiality of the mediation, 8 and the qual-
ifications of a mediator.' 9
The statutory provisions, which authorize the court to order me-
diation and which regulate the alternative form of dispute resolution,
the mediation participants to obtain legal review prior to reaching any agreement. The
mediator has a duty to be impartial and has no power to impose a solution on the
parties.").
17. Id., adding La. R.S. 9:354 ("Upon the resolution of the controversies by the
parties, the mediator shall prepare a written, signed and dated agreement, verified by the
mediator, setting out the settlement terms of the controversies. If an agreement is reached
by the parties through mediation, a consent judgment and/or plan of. mediation incor-
porating the agreement shall be prepared by respective counsel for each of the parties.
The consent judgment and/or plan of mediation shall be submitted to the court for its
approval and signature."). Cf. Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.513(2) (1982).
18. Id., adding La. R.S. 9:355 ("Except as provided in R.S. 9:354, communications
between a mediator and a party to a mediation are confidential. The secrecy of the
communication shall be preserved inviolate as a privileged communication. The commu-
nication shall not be admitted into evidence in any proceeding except with the consent
of both parties. The same protection shall be given to communications between the parties
in the presence of the mediator."). Cf. Cal. Civ. Code § 4607(c) (West 1981); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 552.513(3) (1982).
19. Id., adding La. R.S. 9:356
A. For purposes of this Article, a mediator shall be a person who:
(1) Shall be an attorney who is a member in good standing of the Louisiana
State Bar Association; or
(2) Possesses a Master's degree in counseling, social work, psychology, or
marriage and family counseling; and
(3) Is not a party or representative of a party, or engaged in any therapeutic
relationship with the parties to the dispute.
B. If the mediator is selected by the parties, he or she shall be so named in
an agreement signed by the parties.
Compare the qualifications required of mediators in Michigan and conciliation counselors
in California. Michigan law provides:
(4) A domestic relations mediator who performs mediation under this act shall
have all of the following minimum qualifications:
(a) One or more of the following:
(i) A license or a limited license to engage in the practice of psychology
pursuant to parts 161 and 182 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the
Public Acts of 1978, being sections 333.16101 to 333.16311 and 333.18201 to
333.18237 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, or a master's degree in counseling,
social work, or marriage and family counseling; and successful completion of
the training program provided by the bureau under section 19(3)(b).
(ii) Not less than 5 years of experience in family counseling, preferably in a
setting related to the areas of responsibility of the friend of the court and
preferably to reflect the ethnic population to be served, and successful completion
of the training program provided by the bureau under section 19(3)(b).
(iii) A graduate degree in a behavioral science and successful completion of
a domestic relations mediation training program certified by the bureau with
not less than 40 hours of classroom instruction and 250 hours of practical
experience working under the direction of a person who has successfully com-
pleted a program certified by the bureau.
(iv) Membership in the state bar of Michigan and successful completion of
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are in part identical to California legislation.2 0 California's experience
with similar provisions and documented case histories2' should prove of
invaluable assistance in interpreting and applying our new statute. Ethical
issues,2 2 among others which are raised by the legislation, are deserving
the training program provided by the bureau under section 19(3)(b).
(b) Knowledge of the court system of this state and the procedures used in
domestic relations matters.
(c) Knowledge of other resources in the community to which the parties to
a domestic relations matter can be referred for assistance.
(d) Knowledge of child development, clinical issues relating to children, the
effects of divorce on children, and child custody research.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.513 (1982). California law provides:
(a) Any person employed as a supervising counselor of conciliation or as an
associate counselor of conciliation shall have the following minimum qualifi-
cations:
(1) A masters degree in psychology, social work, marriage, family and child
counseling, or other behavioral science substantially related to marriage and
family interpersonal relationships.
(2) At least two years' experience in counseling or psychotherapy, or both,
preferably in a setting related to the areas of responsibility of the family
conciliation court and with the ethnic population to be served.
(3) Knowledge of the court system of California and the procedures used in
family law cases.
(4) Knowledge of other resources in the community to which clients can be-
referred for assistance.
(5) Knowledge of adult psychopathology and the psychology of families.
(6) Knowledge of child development, clinical issues relating to children, the
effects of divorce on children, and child custody research sufficient to enable
a counselor to assess the mental health needs of children.
(b) The family conciliation court may substitute additional experience for a
portion of the education, or additional education for a portion of the experience,
required under subdivision (a).
(c) The provisions of this section shall be met by all counselors of conciliation
not later than January 1, 1984, provided that this section shall not apply to
any supervising counselor of conciliation who is in office on the effective date
of this section.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1745 (West 1982).
The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at the 1984 Annual
Convention in Chicago approved the "Standards of Practice for Lawyer Me-
diators in Family Disputes." One of the reasons for adopting the standards was
that the use of mediators in family practice was increasing rapidly, largely
without ethical guidelines. 53 U.S.L.W. 2083 (Aug. 14, 1984). See also 10 Farn.
L. Rep. 1552 (Aug. 14, 1984).
20. Cal. Civ. Code § 4607 (West 1981).
21. For examples of case histories, see F. Bienefeld, Child Custody Mediation (1983).
See also King, Handling Custody and Visitation Disputes Under the New Mandatory
Mediation Law, 2 Cal. Law. 40 (1982).
22. See, e.g., Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation,
16 Fain. L.Q. 107 (1982); Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 Fam. L.Q.
219 (1982).
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of more comprehensive and incisive commentary23 than that permitted
by this symposium. However, it is significant that Louisiana, following
the lead of California, continues to be a pioneer in child custody
legislation.
Jurisprudence
Since last year's symposium 24 and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
decision in Plemer v. Plemer,25 there has been a spate of appellate court
23. Hopefully, this legislation will be the subject of a student comment to be published
in the future.
Some suggested readings on the subject of mediation as a form of alternative dispute
resolution for divorce include: 0. Coogler, Structured Mediation in Divorce Settlements
(1978); volume 17, no. 4 of the Family Law Quarterly has an entire section devoted to
articles on the subject with an excellent bibliography at pages 539-40; Rigby, Alternate
Dispute Resolution, 44 La. L. Rev. 1725 (1984) and authorities cited therein.
Judge Robert L. Gottsfield wrote an article which summarized a panel discussion on
mediation and under what circumstances it might not work in volume 18, no. 2 of the
Arizona Bar Journal. The listed circumstances could assist in evaluating whether mediation
is appropriate.
Two cases considered the provisions of article 146(B), as first amended in 1982, which
expressly authorized an award of custody to a non-parent if "an award of custody to a
parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a nonparent is required to
serve the best interest of the child." La. Civ. Code art. 146(B) as amended by 1982 La.
Acts, No. 307, § 1. In re Matter of Parker, 434 So. 2d 1256, 1257 n.2 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1983), described the legislation as a codification of past jurisprudence. However, in
Boyett v. Boyett, 448 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), the court correctly interpreted
the statutory language as a departure from the prior jurisprudential standard:
The use of the word "detrimental" in the new act embraces a wider range
of situations, including those previously recognized in the jurisprudence as cause
for awarding custody to a nonparent . . . . It is reasonable to assume that
had the Legislature intended merely to codify the existing law in this area they
would have incorporated into the statute the familiar and oft-cited phraseology
of the jurisprudence concerning parental rights. Instead, they chose to utilize
language which broadens somewhat the range of situations in which a nonparent
custody award is permissible. The amendment allows more freedom to pursue
what has always been considered the primary consideration in custody cases,
the best interest of the child or children involved.
448 So. 2d at 822. Despite such an observation, the court then seized upon the language
in article 146 that provides that the award of custody to the nonparent must be "required"
to serve the child's best interest:
Art. 146 B. provides that the nonparent [custody] award must be "required"
to serve the child's best interest. The use of the word "required" connotes
necessity. In other words, the nature or extent of the detriment faced by the
child under an award of custody to the parent must be such that it outweighs
the parent's otherwise superior right and makes it necessary or essential, in
pursuit of the child's best interest, that custody be awarded to the nonparent.
Id.
24. Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Persons, 44 La. L. Rev. 463 (1983).
25. 436 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
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opinions interpreting the joint custody legislation. From these decisions,
it is now possible to make some general observations concerning inter-
pretation of the joint custody legislation and accompanying plans of
implementation.
The presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the
child 26 applies when both parents establish their fitness. 27 At least two
appellate court opinions2s recognize that a parent is unfit if he is guilty
of sexual misconduct, 29 or the parent's spouse is guilty of sexual mis-
conduct with the child.3 0 Yet, interestingly enough, parental sexual mis-
conduct is being redefined in some of the more recent opinions. 3'
26. La. Civ. Code art. 146, as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 695, § I ("C. There
shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor
child."). See Schwartz, Toward a Presumption of Joint Custody, 18 Fain. L.Q. 225
(1984).
27. Lake v. Robertson, 452 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); Duhe v. Duhe, 451
So. 2d 1198 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984). See also Note, Louisiana's New Joint Custody
Law, 43 La. L. Rev. 759 (1983), cited as persuasive authority by the court in Lake v.
Robertson, 452 So. 2d at 379.
In commenting upon the effect of the 1983 amendments, the third circuit court of
appeal observed:
As can be seen, one of the major changes in Art. 146 as a result of the most
recent amendment is that it no longer provides that the presumption that joint
custody is in the best interest of the child does not apply if the court, in fact,
finds that joint custody would not be in the best interest of the child. As a
result, the presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child
always exists-it is no longer within the court's discretion to decide that the
presumption is not applicable.
Chaudoir v. Chaudoir, 454 So. 2d 895, 898 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
28. Stevens v. Stevens, 449 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Galeano v. Galeano,
444 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
29. In the Galeano case, there were serious allegations of improper sexual conduct
by the father toward an older female sibling which sufficiently rebutted the presumption
that joint custody was in the best interest of the younger daughter.
30. In the Stevens case, an examination conducted by a physician established that
the six-year-old daughter had been sexually abused by the stepfather, married to the
mother. The court found that the presumption that joint custody was in the best interest
of the child had been overcome and that sole custody in the father was in her best
interest. The court explained that she needed the stability and love of her father to
overcome the psychological damage inflicted by her stepfather. Furthermore, the mother
lived with her younger child, issue of her marriage to the stepfather, who presumably
would be granted visitation rights and be present in the home of her mother. The mother
expressed a desire to move with the children to New York. Therefore, the court awarded
sole custody of the six-year-old daughter to the father.
31. Wickboldt v. Wickboldt, 448 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), involved a
custody contest in which the father was seeking a change of custody from the mother
or in the alternative joint custody. He was seeking a change primarily because of the
mother's moral unfitness, evidenced by the fact that she abused drugs and alcohol and
had lived with two different men without the benefit of marriage. The court, in maintaining
sole custody in the mother with certain restrictions, observed:
The evidence shows that at the time of the hearing, Mrs. Wickboldt was living
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In Peters v. Peters,3 2 the mother began living with the child in a
mobile home owned and occupied by a man who was at the time legally
separated from his wife. The father filed suit seeking a change of custody,
and in August, 1983 a judgment was rendered decreeing joint custody.
While the judgment was being appealed, the mother married the man
with whom she had been living. In dismissing the father's argument
concerning the mother's moral unfitness, the court observed: "In this
case there was no evidence of any aspect of moral unfitness on the part
of the mother other than her attitude toward and her actions in living
with the man she planned to marry."" The mother's attitude in living
with her boyfriend was only one aspect of moral fitness; other aspects,
according to the court, may be "more significant in their effect on a
child, such as the parent's attitude toward criminal activity, drug abuse,
sexual promiscuity in the home, and other activities deemed immoral
in our society."
'34
Such language could be interpreted as a departure from past jur-
isprudence concerning moral fitness but, according to the court, con-
sistent with the 1983 amendment to Article 146, which lists the moral
fitness of the parties as only one of eleven factors to be considered in
determining the. best interests of the child." The implication of the
court's language is that the legislature intended that moral fitness be
with her parents in Baton Rouge; she was working, was not taking drugs at
that time and was not living with a "boyfriend." She still had a problem with
alcohol, but promised to continue attending AA meetings. We find that this
evidence suggests a reasonably stable home environment and an attempt to
"reform" by Mrs. Wickboldt.
Id. at 257. But see Pleasant v. Pleasant, 448 So. 2d 824 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), where
the court of appeal applying the standard of appellate review applicable in child custody
cases, could find no clear abuse of discretion and thus affirmed the trial court's award
of custody to the father:
After trial in August 1983, the district court found that the boyfriend frequently
stayed overnight with the mother in the presence of the children. Noting that
the question of her moral fitness had been at issue in the first custody trial
and was closely resolved in her favor at that time, the court concluded that
the mother's behavior appeared to be of a continuing nature and it was not
in the best interest of the children for her to retain custody. . . . Accepting
these factual findings, and agreeing that the mother's conduct may have a
detrimental effect on the children even though they are now very young, it
remains an extremely close decision on whether the proven indiscretions establish
that a change in custody would be in the best interest of the small children.
Id. at 825.
32. 449 So. 2d 1372 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
33. Id. at 1374.
34. Id.
35. La. Civ. Code art. 146(c)(2), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 695, § 1, "(C.
(2) The presumption in favor of joint custody may be rebutted by a showing that it is
not in the best interest of the child, after consideration of evidence introduced with respect
to all of the following factors: . . . (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved." ).
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considered, but only as one of many factors in a child custody case,
thus deemphasizing its importance.
Despite such implications, closer examination of the facts indicate
that Peters does not represent such a significant departure from past
decisions. The mother's marriage to her paramour, alleged in counsel's
brief and not disputed by the father, in addition to the lack of "any
manifestation that the child was being detrimentally affected by his
present situation" 3 6 influenced the court in reaching its decision. In
summation, the court of appeal commented: "While stating that it did
not condone the mother's behavior, the trial court noted that the moth-
er's relationship with the man appeared stable and it produced no
apparent detrimental effect on the child's well-being." ' 37
Subsequently, in a Third Circuit Court of Appeal decision, the Peters
case was cited as authority for the proposition that a mother's attitude
toward living with a man to whom she was not married is but one
aspect of moral fitness, which is only one of eleven factors to consider
in deciding what custody arrangement is in the best interests of the
child.3 In Lake v. Robertson,39 the father sought a change in custody
or, in the alternative, joint custody on the basis of the mother's moral
unfitness. The mother had been married and divorced- a total of four
times and at the time of the trial was engaged in a sexual relationship
with another man. Testimony of private investigators hired by a prior
husband of the mother, other than the father, established that the mother
took the child with her on nightly visits to the home of her boyfriend.
Without specifically so holding,. the court of appeal presumably
found the mother to be morally fit since it vacated the trial court's
judgment maintaining sole custody in the mother and remanded the case
for a consideration of joint custody. The father was denied sole custody.
According to the court of appeal, the mother had not rebutted the
presumption that joint custody was in the child's best interest. In com-
menting upon the testimony concerning the mother's moral unfitness,
the court quoted from a law review article40 in which the author stated:
Although parental fitness is surely still relevant to the best
interest of the child, its importance may decrease for several
reasons. The presumption in favor of joint custody eliminates
the need for each parent to prove that he or she is more fit
than the other parent. When joint custody is awarded, it does
not matter which parent is 'more fit,' so long as both are fit. 4'
36. Peters, 449 So. 2d at 1375.
37. Id.
38. Lake v. Robertson, 452 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
39. Id. at 379.
40. Note, supra note 27.
41. Id. at 767-68.
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Although the court cited Peters in its opinion, implying similarity,
the facts are distinguishable in two very important respects. First, no
evidence whatsoever indicated that the mother in Lake intended to marry
or had married her co-respondent. In fact, she argued "that a majority
of the states in this country recognize common-law marriages. '42 Such
an argument suggests that she did not intend to marry her co-respondent.
Secondly, although a clinical psychologist testified that the child was
intelligent and had not been abused or neglected during the month she
was in the actual custody of her father, 43 there was no evidence suggesting
that the child had not been adversely affected by her mother's immoral
behavior.
If both parents are fit, the presumption that joint custody is in the
best interest of the child applies, and the burden is on the parent seeking
sole custody to rebut the presumption. General categories of evidence
deemed sufficient to overcome the presumption in some cases include:
(1) severe disagreement over basic issues, such as education, which has
had a detrimental effect on the child;"4 (2) the joint custody arrangement,
based on the distance between the parents 45 in one case, 46 or child care
arrangements that can be made by the parent,4 7 are deemed to be not
42. Lake, 452 So. 2d at 379.
43. Id. at 378 ("Daniel Lonowski, a clinical psychologist, with considerable experience
in the area of child neglect and abuse, testified that he had evaluated the child and found
her to be intelligent and found no evidence of abuse or neglect after the child had been
in the custody of the father for a period of a month. He further testified that the child
had expressed a desire to live with her father, in preference to the mother although she
was unsure whether she wanted to live in Alabama forever. The psychologist attached
significance to the child's preference.").
44. Kincaid v. Kincaid, 444 So. 2d 651, 652 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) ("Here, the
trial court found, as do we, that because of irreconcilable differences between the parents
concerning the child's attending a private religious school and other matters, joint custody
would not be in the best interest of the child. . . . In the present case, in view of the
obvious inability of the parents to agree upon any matter of any importance with respect
to the child; the fact that the differences of the parents had had a traumatic effect upon
the child, and the clear showing that joint custody would reopen old wounds and not
be in the child's best interest, the trial court properly waived the requirement that a plan
of joint custody be drawn or adopted.").
45. Lachney v. Lachney, 446 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984). One parent lived
in Louisiana and the other in South Carolina thus making a joint custody plan unfeasible,
according to the third circuit court of appeal.
46. But see two later decisions in which joint custody was awarded and one parent
lived in California and the other in Louisiana, Krotoski v. Krotoski, 454 So. 2d 374 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1984); and one parent lived in Alexandria, Louisiana and the other parent,
who had had sole custody of the child for nine and one-half years, in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, Chaudoir v. Chaudoir, 454 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
47. In Robicheaux v. Robicheaux, 446 So. 2d 979 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984), the father
traveled frequently, and when he did, his mother with whom he lived might not have
been able to adequately care for the two-year-old child. At age seventy she suffered from
bursitis which prevented her from lifting the child. Although the father's sister also lived
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in the best interest of the child; (3) one parent lacked the ability to
facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship
between the child and the other parent; 48 and (4) stability of environment
which is necessary to the welfare of the child demands continuance of
sole custody. 49 The latter factor tends to be the weakest evidence in
rebutting the presumption; it is almost always found in combination
with other factors militating against joint custody.50
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal will scrutinize carefully a judg-
ment labelled "joint custody" to verify that it is not sole custody with
reasonable visitation.' Such scrutiny is a delicate process since the Second
Circuit recognizes, as do all courts of appeal, that joint custody does
in the home with her mother, she was unable to provide child care arrangements since
she was employed.
48. Price v. Price, 451 So. 2d 1187 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). "The deterioration
and/or destruction of the relationship between Kelvin and his father is detrimental to
Kelvin." Id. at 1191. See La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2)(j).
49. See, e.g., Alloway v. Rodrigue, 451 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984);
Wickboldt v. Wickboldt, 448 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Lachney v. Lachney,
446 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); Kincaid v. Kincaid, 444 So. 2d 651 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1983). In the Wickboldt case, the court reproduced the trial judge's reasons for
judgment where the judge stated:
"Stability is still a very important factor. This child has been with her mother
since November, 1977, at the very least by the pleadings because that's when
the parties separated according to the pleadings. This situation does seem stable
now. She is apparently doing well in school, seems to be very happy, and very
adjusted, and is very happy about her father and his situation, and her new
brother. She has the love and affection of a family, a natural parent, and two
natural grandparents, and an aunt in a stable home at this time. Mr. Wickboldt
is starting a new family with all the problems in starting a new family."
Wickholdt, 448 So. 2d at 256.
At least one recent case has resulted in a joint custody award after the mother had had
sole custody for nine and one-half years. See Chaudoir v. Chaudoir, 454 So. 2d 895 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1984). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Domengeaux stated:
In this case I feel that the trial judge has erred in ordering joint custody.
Without going into detail . .. I believe, that under the amended statute La.
C.C. Art. 146(C)(2), joint custody is not in the best interest of 12 year old
Elizabeth, who has been in her mother's sole custody since she was approximately
two years old under favorable and commendable conditions.
Id. at 902.
50. Id.
51. Carroway v. Carroway, 441 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Adams v.
Adams, 441 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983). In the Adams case, the court made
the following observations:
The judgment in this case awarding joint custody but naming one parent as
"domiciliary parent" with the other parent having reasonable visitation rights
is not truly joint custody. The judgment is in effect no different than the award
of sole custody to one parent under the law as it formerly existed, except for
the co-tutorship and exchange of information provisions of the article which by
implication would be part of the judgment. The judgment ignores, without
explanation or reasons, the express mandate of the article that the parents "share
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not require an equal sharing of physical custody.5 2 Furthermore, a case
will be remanded if there is no accompanying plan of implementation,
either agreed upon or submitted by the parties or court imposed. To
do otherwise, observed the First Circuit Court of Appeal, would result
in two appeals: the first from the initial award of joint custody and
the second from the provisions of the plan of implementation. 3
Concerning the plan of implementation of a joint custody decree,
there appears to be a general hesitancy to find that a particular plan
approved or imposed by the trial court constitutes an abuse of discretion
5 4
Yet, Plemer v. Pleme 55 was an example of the willingness of the court
the physical custody" of the child and that "physical care and custody shall
be shared by the parents."
Adams, 441 So. 2d at 493. In accord, Hatchett v. Hatchett, 449 So. 2d 626 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1984).
But see Clynes v. Clynes, 450 So. 2d 372, 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (Redmann,
C.J., dissenting in part). See also Gaudet v. Gaudet, No. 84-0032, slip op. (La. App.
1st Cir. June 26, 1984), cert. denied, 458 So. 2d 122 (La. 1984) and the dissenting opinion
by Judge Savoie.
52. Such an interpretation was first announced in Plemer v. Plemer, 436 So. 2d 1348
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) and subsequently reiterated by courts of appeal which cite
Plemer as authority. See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 449 So. 2d 1372 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984);
Turner v. Turner, 445 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Adams v. Adams, 441 So.
2d 490 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
53. Little v. Little, 447 So. 2d 1247 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Creary v. Creary, 447
So. 2d 60 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
54. Gaudet v. Gaudet, No. 84-0032, slip op. (La. App. 1st Cir. June 26, 1984);
Peters v. Peters, 449 So. 2d 1372 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Hatchett v. Hatchett, 449
So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Turner v. Turner, 445 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 449 So. 2d 1342 (La. 1984).
In Peters the court stated:
Joint custody opens the door for plans that assure a continued close relationship
between the child and both parents, the primary objective of joint custody, and
such plans should be tailored by the trial courts in accordance with the cir-
cumstances of individual cases. The plan of monthly alternating living arrange-
ments adopted in this case is not, as a matter of law, either required or
prohibited. Whether it will work to the best interest of this particular child
under the particular circumstances of this case remains to be seen, but the
carefully considered plan devised by the trial court in accordance with the code
article should be given a chance to succeed. Undoubtedly, many different plans
of shared custody will be adopted by trial courts in the course of administering
the new joint custody law. Experience with this new-to-Louisiana concept will,
perhaps, develop some guidelines for determining what sort of plans and ar-
rangements seem to most benefit the children involved. Appellate courts should
be very reluctant to interfere with plans ordered by trial courts in the exercise
of their discretion after careful consideration, and should do so only where a
clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated.
Id. at 1376.
55. 436 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), commented on in Spaht, Developments
in the Law, 1982-1983-Persons, 44 La. L. Rev. 463 (1983). See also Duhe v. Duhe, 451
So. 2d 1198 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
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of appeal to modify in certain important respects a very detailed plan
of implementation.56 In Plemer, the areas selected for such modification
have been identified as basic issues in child-rearing: education, 51 residence
during holidays,5" and major medical expenses.5 9 Although there is a
general reluctance to interfere with a plan of implementation on appeal,
it appears that the more detailed the plan concerning basic issues, the
greater the opportunity to scrutinize and modify.
Many joint custody plans of implementation respecting physical cus-
tody provide for residence with one parent during nine months of the
year (corresponding to the school year) and with the other parent during
three months (corresponding to summer vacation). 6° Such plans permit
and facilitate joint custody awards even where the parents live in different
cities or different states. 61 During physical residence with one parent,
the ordinary plan of implementation provides for visitation by the other
parent either on alternating weekends or three weekends a month. 62
Holidays are ordinarily alternated, but important ones, such as Christ-
mas, usually are divided between the parents. 63 More recent cases, how-
56. Plemer, 436 So. 2d at 1349-51.
57. The trial court had imposed a plan giving the mother primary authority to make
educational decisions while the child was in elementary school and then shifted this
authority to the father while the child attended high school. The court of appeal concluded
that this shift in authority was illogical since the mother would have guided this aspect
of the child's rearing for so long and continuity in this critical area was in the child's
best interest.
58.
In order to clarify any possible ambiguity as to holidays and special days, we
interpret the plan to mean that the parents will have custody on alternating
holidays each year. However, allocation of the entire Christmas vacation to one
parent is unrealistic because it totally deprives one parent of visitation during
the two-week Christmas time. Even though we feel the parents would have
worked out their own arrangement to share Christmas, out of caution we amend
the judgment to provide that the non-custodial parent shall have visitation on
December 25 from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., subject to any mutually agreeable
modifications.
Plemer, 436 So. 2d at 1350.
59.
However, it is impractical and unworkable, as provided by the lower court
judgment, for "each parent . . . to provide whatever medical treatment is
necessary while the child is in his (her) physical custody." It is certainly more
reasonable to have both parents pay equally all major medical expenses (not
covered by insurance) regardless of who has custody if treatment becomes
necessary.
Id. at 1351.
60. See, e.g., Hatchett v. Hatchett, 449 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Johnson
v. Johnson, 444 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Plemer v. Plemer, 436 So. 2d 1348
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
61. Chaudoir v. Chaudoir, 454 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
62. Plemer, 436 So. 2d at 1350.
63. See, e.g., id. at 1348.
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ever, reflect more radical64 arrangements for physical custody: for example,
alternating physical custody between the parents yearly, 65 monthly, 66 or
weekly. 67
In Turner v. Turner,68 the mother sought a change in custody from
sole custody in the father to joint custody. The parents had agreed to
sole custody due to the mother's illness. Ultimately, the court ordered
joint custody under a plan which alternated physical custody of the twin
boys yearly. The father on appeal argued, among other things, that the
trial court had abused its discretion in awarding alternating annual
custody. On the trial court's plan of implementation, the court of appeal
commented: "However, while a joint custody award does not require
equal physical custody, there is nothing in Article 146 which indicates
that the judge acted contrary to the law, or in abuse of his discretion
in making an award of equal physical custody in this case.' '69
After granting certiorari, 70 the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the
trial court's judgment ordering joint custody and remanded the case
with specific instructions "not to render a joint custody decree or
extensive visitation privileges to the non-custodial parent, absent a clear
showing by both of the parties that they are willing and capable of
serving the children to the children's best interest." ' 71 Specifically, the
trial court was directed to determine which of the two parents-"without
regard for the 'needs' of the parents-can serve better the best interest
of the children." 72
Considering all of the evidence presented, the history of child care
arrangements previously established by the court, and the extensive lit-
igation, 73 the supreme court concluded that the presumption that joint
custody was in the children's best interest had been overcome. What
the court observed concerning the proper application of the presumption
is instructive. Recognizing that the presumption has created confusion,
the court stated:
64. In Lambert v. Lambert, 452 So. 2d 244 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), the court
awarded joint custody, with physical custody given to the father for four weeks, and the
mother for one week, on a rotating basis. Three major factors influencing the court's
decision were: "I) Mrs. Lambert's drinking problem; 2) her suicide attempt; and 3) the
quality of the environment offered by the parties parents." Id. at 247.
65. Turner v. Turner, 445 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. granted, 449 So. 2d
1342 (La. 1984).
66. Peters v. Peters, 449 So. 2d 1372 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
67. Duhe v. Duhe, 451 So. 2d 1198 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
68. 445 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
69. Id. at 38.
70. 449 So. 2d 1342 (La. 1984).
71. 455 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (La. 1984).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1380.
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The article 146 presumption only compels the judge to award
joint custody in those cases where other things are equal; or
where there is insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption;
or whenever neither parent alone would be able to manage a
sole custody arrangement, and where it cannot be shown that
it would be detrimental to the child to remain in parental cus-
tody. 74
The court commented that the presumption simply afforded the
judge with a "first choice," or preference 71 "which choice must be
rejected in the face of evidence which tends to disprove the conclusion. '76
The trial judge "cannot rest on the legislative presumption to solve its
case, but must become an active participant in the case." ' 77 The child's
well-being and health being the responsibility of the trial judge, he "sits
as a sort of fiduciary on behalf of the child, and must pursue actively
that course of conduct which will be of the greatest benefit to the
child." 7
Consistently with earlier court of appeal decisions, the supreme court
found that the presumption was rebutted because of the serious conflicts
between the mother and father, many of which involved basic issues of
child rearing, such as education and discipline. 79 Furthermore, the court
added that the seven-year-old twin boys are "in their formative years
right now, and it is essential that they have a single authority upon
which they can base their behavior and development." ' 0 Such a pron-
ouncement by the supreme court is significant, especially in combination
with its emphasis of the proposition that the paramount concern remains
the best interest of the child.8"
The decision is commendable and recognizes some of the serious
concerns raised by the author in last year's symposium.8 2 The carefully
considered opinion by the supreme court in the Turner case will assist
74. Id. at 1379.
75. La. Civ. Code art. 146 ("A. If there are children of the marriage whose provisional
custody is claimed by both husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided,
custody shall be awarded in the following order of preference, according to the best
interest of the children: (1) To both parents jointly. ... ) (emphasis added).
76. 455 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (La. 1984).
77. Id. at 1380.
78. Id. at 1379.
79. Id. at 1380.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. La. Civ. Code art. 146 ("A. If there are children of the marriage whose provisional
custody is claimed by both husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided,
custody shall be awarded in the following order of preference, according to the best
interest of the children: (I) To both parents jointly. ... ) (emphasis added).
82. Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Persons, 44 La. L. Rev. 463 (1983).
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the courts in implementing controversial legislation 3 which has enormous
human impact for the citizens of the state of Louisiana.
83. In Gaudet v. Gaudet, Judge Savoie, dissenting, commented: "It appears that the
legislative mandate giving preference to the concept of joint custody is unpalatable to the
trial court and the majority of this panel. It may not be to my liking either. Yet, joint
custody remains a solemn expression of legislative will which we are bound to uphold."
Gaudet, No. 84-0032, slip op. at 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. Jun. 26, 1984) (Savoie, J., dissenting).
See also discussion of trial judge's disposition of custody case under joint custody statute
in Wickboldt v. Wickboldt, 448 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (dissent); Pleasant
v. Pleasant, 448 So. 2d 824 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Carroway v. Carroway, 441 So.
2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); and Adams v. Adams, 441 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1983).

